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Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field
Displace Competition in the Marketplace?
JOSEPH P. BAUER*
INTRODUCTION
A casual glance at the daily newspapers would suggest that
athletes and sports teams spend almost as much time squaring off
in the courts as they do on the playing fields. Professional football
players complain that the teams for which they play and the National
Football League have conspired to impose illegal restraints on their
ability to offer their services to other teams. A baseball team went
to court to challenge the decision by the now-deposed Commissioner
of Baseball to shift it from one division to another. College players,
coaches, and universities all contend that various rules imposed by
the National Collegiate Athletic Association are unlawful. The list
seems endless.
Principal among the theories asserted by plaintiffs in many of
these cases is that these practices violate the antitrust laws. Yet,
challenges in the sports world which assert claims arising under the
antitrust laws are nothing new; indeed, they extend back over seven
decades.' Ever since, courts have sought to adjust the needs of
athletes, teams, and sports leagues to the frequently conflicting goals
of competition promoted by the antitrust laws. This Article will
review many of these past disputes, as well as provide an overview




Numerous facets of the various professional sports benefit either
from complete or partial immunity from potential antitrust actions.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D. 1969, Harvard Law
School; A.B. 1965, University of Pennsylvania. This Article is an advance version
of a chapter in Volume X of the treatise Federal Antitrust Law by Earl W. Kintner
and Joseph P. Bauer, published by Anderson Publishing Co. All rights reserved.
1. See, e.g., Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2. "It is certainly no secret to these parties, to this Court, or to the average
eight-year-old sports fan that antitrust issues exist in professional sports." National
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The existence and extent of this immunity depends both on the
particular sport in question and the activity being challenged.
Professional baseball enjoys the anomalous position of having a
complete exemption from antitrust challenge. While other profes-
sional sports remain subject to antitrust scrutiny, their conduct is
often held to less rigorous standards than conventional industries. In
addition, various aspects of the business of sports have been accorded
protection-either complete or partial-from potential antitrust ac-
tions. These activities include agreements for the broadcasting of
sporting events, certain mergers of sports leagues, restraints on the
ability of players freely to chose the teams for which they will play,
and restrictions on geographic moves by sports franchises.
A. Baseball'
Organized baseball has enjoyed a complete exemption from the
application of the antitrust laws since 1922. In Federal Baseball Club
Hockey League v. National Hockey League Players Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 288, 295
(D. Minn. 1992). See generally LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS (Gary
A. Uberstine ed., 1988); JOHN C. WEISTART & Cym L. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
§§ 5.01-.02 (1979 & Supp. 1985); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports
Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Questions, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 (1988);
Jerome F. Leavell & Howard L. Millard, Trade Regulation and Professional Sports,
26 MERCER L. REV. 603 (1975); John P. Morris, Keeping the Game Fair and
Square-Antitrust Laws and Professional Sports in America, 59 AUSTL. L.J. 476
(1985); Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust,
the Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
945 (1988); Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports
Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MLAl L. REv. 729
(1987); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Thoughts on International Professional Sports Leagues
and the Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 67 DENy. U. L. REv. 193
(1990); Paul J. Tagliabue, Antitrust Developments in Sports and Entertainment, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 341 (1987); Steven G. Biddle, Note, Less Restrictive Alternatives
for Achieving and Maintaining Competitive Balance in Professional Sports, 30 ARIZ.
L. REv. 889 (1988); Lori J. Brown, Note, The Battle: From the Playing Field to
the Courtroom-United States Football League v. National Football League, 18 U.
TOL. L. REV. 871 (1987); James F. Foley, Comment, Antitrust and Professional
Sport: Does Anyone Play by the Rules of the Game?, 22 CATH. U. L. REv. 403
(1973); John J. Scura, Comment, The Time Has Come: Ending the Antitrust Non-
Enforcement Policy in Professional Sports, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 151 (1992);
Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the
Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REV. 418 (1967).
3. See generally articles cited infra note 15; Robert G. Berger, After the
Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust
Laws, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 209 (1983); Thomas M. Boswell & Richard B. McKeown,
Baseball-From Trial by Law to Trial by Auction, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 171 (1978);
H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're Out: An Investigation of Professional
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REv. 369 (1988); John Eckler, Base-
ball-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. CI. L. REV. 56 (1949); John P. Morris, In the
Wake of the Flood, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (1972); John W. Neville,
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of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,4
challenges were made against the contractual relationships between
the major league teams and their players, which subsequently came
to be known as the "reserve system." Rejecting the plaintiff's claims,
the United States Supreme Court held that the business of baseball
principally involved intrastate activities, to which the antitrust laws
did not apply, since their reach extends only to interstate commercei
Although this crabbed View of the general scope of the Commerce
Clause has long since been eroded, and therefore the predicate for
the Federal Baseball Club decision has disappeared, the Supreme
Court has on two subsequent occasions reaffirmed that baseball
remains exempt from potential antitrust liability. 6 Flood v. Kuhn,7
the more recent of these two cases, offered two principal rationales
for this result- Congress' "positive inaction" and the doctrine of
stare decisis. s The Court noted that Congress has been well aware of
the unique position enjoyed by baseball compared to other organized
Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 208 (1947); C. Paul
Rogers, III, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the
Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REv. 611 (1977); Paul W. Shapiro, Monopsony Means
Never Having to Say You're Sorry-A Look at Baseball's Minor Leagues, 4 J.
CONTEMP. L. 191 (1978); Frank B. Lewis, Note, Antitrust Laws and Professional
Baseball, 19 N.Y.U. INTRAMURAL L. REV. 235 (1964); Comment, Monopsony in
Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576 (1953);
Allie J. Prescott, III, Note, 2 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 299 (1972); Recent Decision,
Antitrust Laws-The Applicability of Federal and State Antitrust Laws to the Sport
of Baseball-Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), 1971 U. TOL. L. REv.
594.
4. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). The plaintiff, a member club of the defunct Federal
League, asserted that the National and American Leagues and their member clubs
had conspired to monopolize the business of baseball. Id. at 207.
5. Id. The Court stated:
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs. It is true that ... competitions must be arranged between clubs
from different cities and States. But the fact that in order to give the
exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines ...
is not enough to change the character of the business .... [Tihe transport
is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is incident, the
exhibition, although made for money would not be called trade or commerce
in the commonly accepted use of those words.
Id. at 208-09.
6. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
7. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). The plaintiff, a major league baseball player,
challenged baseball's reserve system-a set of uniform contract provisions that bound
a player in perpetuity to the club which held his contract (or the club to which this
contract was assigned), and that prevented him from negotiating with any other
club. Flood alleged that the reserve system constituted a conspiracy among the
League members, whereby all other clubs agreed to boycott his services. Id. at 260-
61.
8. Id. at 283.
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sports, as well as the change in general case law under the Commerce
Clause.9 Nonetheless, although some legislative attempts have been
made to overrule the Federal Baseball Club result, all have proven
unsuccessful. 0 The Flood Court concluded that this history indicated
congressional acquiescence in-if not satisfaction with-the particular
rule." As a result, although baseball's anomalous position arguably
is both "inconsistent" and "illogical,' ' 2 this exemption, which was
originally the product of judicial creation, is now "fully entitled to
the benefit of stare decisis."' 3
Since the Flood decision, baseball's antitrust exemption has been
eroded on the periphery. For example, one court has held that the
exemption only applies to the actual enterprise of baseball and not
to contracts for the radio-broadcasting of games. 4 Furthermore,
much of the flexibility that baseball teams enjoyed in their dealings
with their players has been eroded through collective bargaining
agreements." However, the core rule-that the "business of baseball"
9. Id.
10. "Since Toolson more than 50 bills have been introduced in Congress
relative to the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to baseball. A
few of these passed one house or the other." Id. at 281 & n. 17 (footnote omitted).
11. "The Court ... has concluded that Congress as yet has had no intention
to subject baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes. This,
obviously, has been deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence
and passivity." Id. at 283.
12. "If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency
or illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this
Court." Id. at 284.
13. Id. at 282. See generally Richard B. Blackwell, Note, Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 859 (1971); John J. McQuaide, Note, Curt Flood at Bat Against
Baseball's "Reserve Clause," 8 SAN Dnoo L. REv. 92 (1971); Barton J. Meritore,
Comment, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 737 (1971); Joseph P. Paonessa, Case Comment, 48 NOTRE
DAmE LAW. 460 (1972).
14. Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp.
263 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Cf. Amateur Softball Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 467
F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972) (absolute exemption does not extend to amateur baseball);
Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (contract between baseball team and concessionaire is subject to antitrust
laws), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009
(1975); Liberty Broadcasting Sys. v. National League Baseball Club, 1952 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 67,278 (N.D. Il. 1952) (no discussion of potential antitrust immunity
to challenge of baseball club's restrictions of broadcasts).
15. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. See generally Robert A.
McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in
Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1131 (1982); David Steinberg, Application
of the Antitrust and Labor Exemptions to Collective Bargaining of the Reserve
System of Professional Baseball, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1301 (1982); Scott A. Dann,
Note, The Effect of Collective Bargaining on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 12
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 807 (1984); Stephen L. Willis, Comment, A Critical Perspective
of Baseball's Collusion Decisions, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 109 (1991).
[Vol. 60
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is immune from antitrust challenge 6 -remains as a curious vestige
of early twentieth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
B. Other sports-general
Unlike organized baseball, the activities of all other professional
sports are subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court has expressly held that the antitrust laws apply to professional
football' 7 and professional boxing, 8 and the Court has further indi-
cated in dictum that other sports are also subject to antitrust liabil-
ity.19 Numerous lower court decisions have in fact applied the antitrust
16. It is clear that the exemption extends beyond the legality of baseball's
reserve system, which was the narrow issue involved in the three Supreme Court
cases. For example, in Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 540-41 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978), a baseball club owner asserted that the
decision of the Commissioner of Baseball, disallowing the trade of three of its
players on the ground that the transactions were contrary to the best interests of
organized baseball, was an unlawful conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
Applying the exemption to this conduct, the Seventh Circuit held that "the Supreme
Court intended to exempt the business of baseball, not any particular facet of that
business, from the federal antitrust laws." Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). See also
Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.
1970) (declining to reject application of exemption to complaint by former baseball
umpires that their discharge was result of conspiracy), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001
(1971); Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 368 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D. Ore.
1971) (action by former minor league team franchisee against organized baseball
exempt from antitrust laws), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
Cf. Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981) (contract
between major league baseball players union and bubble gum manufacturer for
exclusive licensing of right to sell baseball cards not unlawful under §§ 1 and 2 of
Sherman Act; decision on merits, no reference to possible exemption). But see
Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949) (post-1922
involvement of organized baseball with radio and television broadcasting may
undermine holding of Federal Baseball); Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 403 (2d
Cir. 1949) (same as Martin).
17. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See generally
John A. Gray & Stephen J. K. Walters, Is the NFL an Illegal Monopoly?, 66 U.
DET. L. REv. 5 (1988).
18. United States v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
19. "Other professional sports operating interstate- football, boxing, bas-
ketball, and presumably, hockey and golf-are not so exempt." Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972) (footnotes omitted). See also Haywood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971) ("Basketball,
however, does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws"). Cf. Resolution Would
Limit or Rescind Professional Sports' Antitrust Exemption, Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1528, at 182 (Aug. 8, 1991) (Senate resolution to limit or eliminate
exemption for professional football, baseball, basketball and hockey). See generally
Jon S. Hainline, Matchpoint: Agents, Antitrust and Tennis, 64 U. DET. L. REV.
481 (1987); George A. Metanis, Thomas J. Cryan & David W. Johnson, A Critical
Look at Professional Tennis Under Antitrust Law, 4 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 57 (1987);
Mark S. Miller, The National Hockey League's Faceoff with Antitrust: McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 42 0Ho ST. L.J. 603 (1981).
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laws to these other sports. 20 Therefore, the possibility of different
analysis under the antitrust laws requires examination of the partic-
ular conduct involved; this treatment will be considered in the balance
of this Article.
1. Mergers
The creation of a new sports league has the potential of giving
rise to various competitive pressures with the preexisting league,
including bidding for players' services, loss of attendance at games,
and diminution of telecasting or licensing revenues. In the past, in a
number of instances, the response to the presence of rival sports
leagues has been a merger between the existing league and the new
entrant.
Absent some exemption, these consolidations would be tested by
the same standard applicable to industry generally-Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 2 1 As noted above, organized baseball enjoys a general,
common-law exemption, and, since 1966, professional football has
operated under a statutory umbrella, which immunizes "a joint
agreement by which the member clubs of two or more professional
football leagues . . . combine their operations in expanded single
league . . . if such agreement increases rather than decreases the
number of professional football clubs so operating." 22 This legislation
authorized the merger of the American Football League (AFL) with
the older, larger National Football League (NFL).23
Other professional sports do not enjoy a similar exemption. 24
Although several other sports leagues have lobbied in Congress for
similar legislation, to date these have proven unsuccessful.
Subsequent to the passage of the 1966 amendment for professional
football, rival football leagues have been started on two occasions;
in both instances, the new league folded after a few seasons. These
20. See, e.g., Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 384 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.
1967) (hockey); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir.) (golf), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
23. That merger had been preceded by a lawsuit brought by the AFL against
the NFL, in which the AFL unsuccessfully challenged the older league's position
under monopolization and attempt to monopolize theories. American Football
League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
24. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (proposed merger of two basketball leagues enjoined;
professional basketball does not have same antitrust status as baseball). See also
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(refusing to dissolve injunction), settlement of class action approved, 72 F.R.D. 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 60
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attempts then spawned litigation, in which this statutory exemption
played a spill-over role.
The first post-1966 rival football league-the World Football
League (WFL)-began operation in 1974. After it was disbanded in
1975, the WFL team that had been located in Memphis, Tennessee,
sought an NFL franchise. When its application was refused, it
brought an action against the NFL under Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.25 The 1966 amendment admittedly had the effect of
conferring market power on the defendants; 26 the plaintiff argued
that the statute also required that this market power be shared. 27
Rejecting this assertion, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit concluded that the amendment was not intended "to
increase competition in professional football, but to permit geo-
graphic enlargement of the NFL's market power. ' ' 28 Although there
might have been a diminution of certain kinds of competition 9 as a
result of the 1966 amendment and the subsequent NFL-AFL merger,
the asserted harm to a rejected franchise applicant was neither caused
by the merger nor protected by the statute. 0
The more recent rival to the NFL-the United States Football
League (USFL)-began operations in 1983 and abandoned play in
1985. Even before its demise, the USFL brought Section 1 and 2
claims against its larger competitor. Instead of challenging the NFL's
25. Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir.
1983).
26. "That congressional decision conferred on the NFL the market power
which it holds in the market for professional football." Id. at 784.
27. "[Ilt is the Grizzlies' contention that the statute which authorized NFL
acquisition of monopoly power in the professional football market required not only
that the league members refrain from abusing that power against potential compet-
itors, but that it take affirmative steps to share its market power with others." Id.
28. Id. at 785. The court explained:
Since the 1966 statute is not directed at preservation of competition in the
market for professional football, and cannot be construed as conferring
any economic benefit on the class to which the Grizzlies belong, we conclude
that it does not oblige the NFL to permit entry by any particular applicant
to the NFL shared market power.
Id.
29. The plaintiff asserted that the merger resulted in potential anti-competitive
effects in the area of "intra-league, non-athletic competition." Id. at 786. These
effects included rivalry for players and coaching personnel, for ticket buyers, for
local broadcast revenue, and for sale of concession items such as food and beverages.
Id.
30. As the court noted:
Congress by legislation in 1961 and 1966 authorized the NFL acquisition
of the market power which it holds, and the Grizzlies cannot challenge
that acquisition. The only action they complain of is their exclusion from
the shared monopoly, but they have failed to show that their admission
would be contra-competitive in any way.
Id. at 788.
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structure directly, the USFL attacked the NFL's contracts with all
three television networks as barriers to entry and also challenged
various asserted forms of predatory conduct. A jury entered a verdict
for the plaintiff on some of the monopolization claims, but it rejected
the USFL's attacks on the television contracts; the jury awarded the
USFL only nominal damages, and the trial court refused to grant
injunctive relief.31 In the course of affirming this judgment, 32 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with
the Third Circuit's observation: The statutory provisions authorizing
football league mergers effectively insulate professional football from
attacks on its league structure."
2. Broadcasting
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States Department of
Justice brought two actions against the NFL, challenging restraints
it had imposed in connection with contracts with television networks
for the broadcasting of its football games.3 4 The earlier action 3
attacked bylaws the NFL had adopted, which imposed restrictions
on radio and television broadcasts of games into the "home territory '3 6
of another league member.37 In a 1953 decision, the federal district
court, recognizing that certain restraints on competition were neces-
sary to equalize both the on-field strength of the teams and the
financial well-being of the entire enterprise, initially concluded that
these bylaws would be tested under the rule of reason.38 The court
then held that while certain League restraints on broadcasting were
lawful,3 9 others were unreasonable and therefore prohibited by the
31. United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp.
1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
32. United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d
1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
33. "Congress has authorized the NFL's single-league structure and its joint
economic operations .... Because of the explicit congressional authorization in
1966 for the NFL-AFL merger and single-league operation, the USFL does not
attack the league structure directly." Id. at 1379-80.
34. United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa.
1961); United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
35. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
36. "Home territory" was defined in the NFL bylaws as the area within 75
miles of the boundaries of a league city (with certain exceptions). Id. at 321.
37. The bylaws prohibited, inter alia, radio broadcasts into a team's home
territory of other teams' games while that team was playing a home game, and
television broadcasts into a team's home territory of other teams' games, irrespective
of whether a home game was being played or not. Id.
38. Id. at 324.
39. Id. at 326. The court approved the by-law blacking out the television




Sherman Act.40 As a result, the NFL was forced to modify its
restrictions on game broadcasts.
Prior to 1961, the individual NFL teams had entered into separate
television contracts with broadcasters. In that year, the NFL entered
into a master contract with the CBS television network. The NFL
then returned to the district court that had entered the final decree
in the earlier action, seeking a determination whether this contract
was lawful.41 That court held that since the contract would have
allowed CBS exclusive discretion to determine whether to broadcast
any particular game in any particular market, the contract was
inconsistent with the earlier judgment. 42
In response to that decision, Congress agreed to confer a statutory
exemption not only on broadcasts of professional football games,
but also on those of professional baseball, basketball, and hockey; 43
the amendment-the Sports Broadcasting Act-permits teams to pool
their individual rights to telecasts and to sell these pooled rights as
a package." The amendment also declares that member clubs may
"black out" telecasts of games within their "home territory" when
those clubs play a home game .4 5 The effect of this legislation was to
overrule the 1961 district court decision, while codifying the 1953
40. Id. at 327. The court struck down all prohibitions on radio broadcasts
and on television broadcasts into a team's home territory while it was itself not
playing a home game. Id.
41. United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
42. Id. at 447. The court also noted that by use of a master contract, "the
member clubs of the League have eliminated competition among themselves in the
sale of television rights to their games." Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-
95 (1988)).
44. The amendment provides:
The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or
among persons engaging in or conducting the organized team sports of
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey con-
tests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's
member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball,
basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by
such clubs.
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
45. The exemption does "not apply to any joint agreement ... which
prohibits any person to whom such rights are sold or transferred from televising
any games within any area, except within the home territory of a member club of
the league on a day when such club is playing a game at home." 15 U.S.C. § 1292
(1988). Cf. Hertel v. City of Pontiac, 470 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (rule did
not deprive residents of "blacked-out" metropolitan area of equal protection within
meaning of Fourteenth Amendment).
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holding regarding television blackouts.46 Ironically, although the
amendment was passed to overturn a judgment affecting professional
football, the exemption placed certain times-of-the-week restrictions
on football telecasts, which are not imposed on the other three
sports .47
Subsequent case law indicates that this amendment affords sub-
stantial protection to sports leagues in the four covered sports with
respect to their sale of telecasting rights. Not only has the statute
been read expansively to include broad grants of rights; it has also
been used successfully as a shield against charges of monopolization
or attempts to monopolize resulting from the exercise of the rights
conferred. 41
There are several examples of the broad interpretation of the
statutory exemption. Thus, it has been held applicable to telecasts
46. See generally Cori Jan Ching, Note, A Critique of the National Football
League's "Blackout" Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, 8 J. LEGIs. 104 (1981).
47. To prevent professional football telecasts from affecting high school or
college football attendance, the exemption, as amended in 1966, does not apply to
a television package which would permit
the telecasting of all or a substantial part of any professional football game
on any Friday after six o'clock postmeridian or on any Saturday during
the period beginning on the second Friday in September and ending on the
second Saturday in December in any year from any telecasting station
located within seventy-five miles of the game site of any intercollegiate or
interscholastic football contest scheduled to be played on such a date if-
(1) such intercollegiate football contest is between institutions of higher
learning both of which confer degrees upon students following completion
of sufficient credit hours to equal a four-year course, or
(2) in the case of an interscholastic football contest, such contest is
between secondary schools, both of which are accredited or certified under
the laws of the State or States in which they are situated and offer courses
through the twelfth grade of the standard school curriculum, or the
equivalent, and
(3) such intercollegiate or interscholastic football contest and such
game site were announced through publication in a newspaper of general
circulation prior to August 1 of such year as being regularly scheduled for
such day and place.
15 U.S.C. § 1293 (1988).
48. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1396 (9th Cir.) ("[tfo effectuate this right [to engage in
collective negotiation for telecasting of games], the League must be allowed to have
some control over the placement of teams to ensure NFL football is popular in a
diverse group of markets"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). But see Henderson
Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 269-70 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (Act inapplicable to contract licensing right to radio broadcasts of baseball
games). See generally Phillip A. Garubo, The Last Legal Monopoly: The NFL and
its Television Contracts, 4 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 357 (1987); Stephen F. Ross, An
Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J.
463 (1990); Scott L. Hoffman, Note, Pooling of Local Broadcasting Income in the
American Baseball League-Antitrust and Constitutional Issues, 32 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 841 (1981).
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of league championship games as well as to regular games. 49 It has
been interpreted to confer protection against television signals re-
ceived within the "home territory" of a team playing at home, and
not merely to telecasts of competing games by broadcasters who are
located within that territory. 0 In addition, the exemption has been
held applicable to contracts with more than one network. 51
As noted above, 52 two major challenges to the monopoly position
of the NFL have been raised by ultimately unsuccessful rival leagues.
Although the WFL's action did not challenge the broadcasting ar-
49. Blaich v. National Football League, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
50. WTWV, Inc. v. National Football League, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982).
51. United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d
1335, 1353-55 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Colorado High Sch. Activities Ass'n v.
National Football League, 711 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1983) (requirement in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1293(3) that high school seeking protection against simultaneous telecasting of
professional football game must specify "game site," requires identification of actual
field or stadium and is not satisfied by specification of metropolitan area in which
game would be played).
One case, however, limited the reach of the Act in a dispute between the
National Basketball Association (NBA) and one of its teams, the Chicago Bulls,
involving television broadcasting rights. The NBA had entered into broadcasting
contracts with two networks for a number of its games. The NBA also allowed
individual teams to enter into their own contracts for other games with broadcasters;
however, in an effort to prevent competition with League-licensed broadcasts, the
NBA placed a limit of 20 games per season on individual team licenses with so-
called "superstations." The Bulls had entered into a contract with such a "super-
station," providing for the broadcast of 25 of their games per season; when the
NBA sought to prevent this as violative of its League restrictions, the Bulls challenged
the restraint under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
In Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n,
754 F. Supp. 1336, 1349-52 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1992), the district court held that this League provision
was not shielded from antitrust attack by the Act. The exemption extends only to
"any joint agreement ... by which any league . . . transfers all or any part of the
right of [the] league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of ... games."
Id. at 1350 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1291) (1988) (emphasis added). The court held
that the Act does not apply either to agreements by individual teams or to agreements
by which the league seeks to prevent the transfer of those rights. Id. at 1352. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the determination that the Act did not exempt
the League's restrictions. 961 F.2d at 670. It concluded that the statutory language,
authorizing the transfer of "all or any part of" the rights to games, included the
authority to grant those rights to a particular network and then to withhold the
exercise of that right by individual teams to other broadcasters, and thus the NBA
might have been able to achieve this restriction by other means, especially if it could
make a showing of its appropriate purpose and the overall benefit to consumers.
Id. However, here the NBA's licenses with the other networks had not in fact sought
to control all potential broadcasts. Since the Act was special interest legislation, it
had to be read in limited fashion. Id. Cf. Nishimura v. Dolan, 599 F. Supp. 484
(E.D. N.Y. 1984) (cable television company lacked standing to challenge exclusive
licensing contracts between various professional sports teams and competing cable
company).
52. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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rangements,53 the plaintiffs' principal claims in the USFL's action
were predicated on the NFL's use of television contracts as barriers
to entry and as a means of enhancing the NFL's market power.54
However, the court of appeals rejected that argument, instead finding
that "the Sports Broadcasting Act . . . exempt[s] from antitrust
scrutiny a league's pooled-rights contracts with networks unless they
constitute illegal monopolization or an unreasonable restraint of trade
so far as competing leagues are concerned." 55
This amendment and subsequent case law interpreting it have
resulted in the enhancement of the market power of the existing
professional sports leagues, while making entry by new leagues more
difficult and less likely. Although the congressional history indicates
antipathy to this entrenchment of the existing competitors,5 6 Congress
probably was also aware that this indeed would be one effect of this
legislation.5 7 Future application of this exemption will probably rec-
ognize this inconsistency.
3. Restraints on Players"
Numerous commentators have pointed to a unique aspect of the
nature of competition appropriate to team sports: While the individ-
53. Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3d
Cir. 1983) ("[T]he Grizzlies make no complaint about the operation of the NFL
arrangements for joint sale of television rights.")
54. United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d
1335, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he USFL candidly admits that 'at the heart of
this case' are its claims that the NFL, by contracting with the three major networks
and by acting coercively toward them, prevented the USFL from acquiring a network
television contract indispensable to its survival.").
55. Id. at 1358. The court also approved the trial court's requirement that it
had to "show that the intent and effect of the NFL's television contracts with the
major networks were exclusionary (rather than simply intent or effect) in order to
prove a Section 2 claim." Id. (emphasis in original).
56. "The [House] committee does not intend that an exemption from the
antitrust laws should be made available to a league or its members where the intent
or effect of a joint agreement is to exclude a competing league or its members from
the sale of any of their television rights." H.R. REp. No. 1178, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1961), quoted in United States Football League v. National Football League,
842 F.2d 1335, 1354 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 784 (3d
Cir. 1983) ("Congress could not have been unaware that the necessary effect of the
television revenue sharing scheme which it approved for the NFL would be that all
members of that league would be strengthened . . .to the potential disadvantage of
new entrants.").
58. See generally Panel Presentation: Developments in Sports and the Law
and the Interplay of Antitrust and Labor Law, 125 F.R.D. 293 (1988); articles cited
infra note 73; John R. Allison, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Status
of the Reserve System, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1973); Robert C. Berry & William B.
Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls
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ual teams-and their corporate entities-can be competitors in a
number of respects, some measure of cooperation is essential for
success of the entire enterprise. 9 Some of these measures are obvious.
The teams must agree on the rules of the game, uniforms and
and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 685 (1981); Lee Goldman, The Labor
Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers' Labor Market Restraints
in Sports and Non-sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 617; Michael S. Jacobs &
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes:
Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971); Leslie M. Lava, The Battle of
the Superstars: Player Restraints in Professional Team Sports, 32 U. FLA. L. REv.
669 (1980); Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports,
1989 DUKE L.J. 339; Stephen R. McAllister, The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
and Player Restraints in Professional Sports: The Promised Land or a Return to
Bondage?, 4 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 283 (1987); Robert A. McCormick, Labor Relations
in Professional Sports-Lessons in Collective Bargaining, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
501 (1988); Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The
Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19 (1986);
Barry S. Roberts and Brian A. Powers, Defining the Relationship Between Antitrust
Law and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19
WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (1978); Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on
the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 337 (1986);
John C. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons From the Sports
Industry, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (1981); Phillip R. Bryce, Note, The
Sherman Act and Professional Team Sports: The NFL Rozelle Rule Invalid Under
the Rule of Reason: Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), 9 CONN. L. REV. 336 (1977); Keith J. Burr, Comment, Player Control
Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 645 (1973); D. Albert
Daspin, Note, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out the
Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95 (1986); Douglas A. Econn, Note, Servitude In Profes-
sional Sport-McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979), 2
WHTTIER L. REV. 559 (1990); Georgann H. Eglinsk, Note, Antitrust-Professional
Football-The Rozelle Rule as an Unreasonable Restraint of Trade, 26 KAN. L.
REv. 121 (1977); Bernard B. Kornmehl, Comment, National Football League Res-
trictions on Competitive Bidding for Players' Services, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 613 (1975);
Paul L. Nelson, Note, Professional Sports and the Non-statutory Labor Exemption
to Federal Antitrust Law: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 11 U. TOL. L. REV.
633 (1980); Daniel C. Nester, Comment, Labor Exemption to Antitrust Scrutiny in
Professional Sports, 15 S.M.U. L.J. 123 (1990); Note, The NFL Draft and the
Antitrust Laws-The Player Draft of the National Football League Held to Violate
the Federal Antitrust Laws. Smith v. Pro-Football, 41 ALB. L. REV. 154 (1977);
Donald Novick, Note, The Legality of the Rozelle Rule and Related Practices in
the National Football League, 4 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 581 (1976); Keith A. Prettyman,
Note, The True Story of What Happens When the Big Kids Say, "It's my football,
and you'll either play by my rules or you won't play at all, " 55 NEB. L. REv. 335
(1976); Steven M. Strauss, Comment, Sport in Court: The Legality of Professional
Football's System of Reserve and Compensation, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 252 (1980);
John T. Whiting, Recent Decision, Illegal Procedure-The Rozelle Rule Violates the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 632 (1976).
59. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRiK, TrE ANTITRUST PARADox 332 (1978) ("Agree-
ments to refuse to deal are essential to the effectiveness and sometimes to the
existence of many wholly beneficial economic activities. All league sports . . .rest
entirely upon the right to boycott.").
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equipment, the dates and locations of each contest, and so on. Other
areas for cooperation are only slightly less clear. For example, if
only certain teams had access to the best players, so that the other
teams were perpetually consigned to second-rank status on the playing
field, fan interest in the entire league would eventually diminish, and
all teams, and indeed the league itself, would be adversely impacted.60
It has therefore been recognized that some limitations on uninhibited
competition are necessary both to enhance competition in the long
run and for the success of the overall enterprise.
One potential implication of this need for cooperation-and
indeed the shared interest of the league and its member teams in
advancing their common welfare-is that they might be viewed as a
"single entity," incapable of entering into a "conspiracy" in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although there is support for this
view both in the cases 61 and in law journal commentary, 62 the
predominant position is that the teams are separate and distinct
entities from the league of which they are members.63 While the
60. See, e.g., North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670
F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir.) ("the economic success of each franchise is dependent on
the quality of sports competition throughout the league and the economic strength
and stability of other league members"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[n]o NFL team, in
short, is interested in driving another team out of business, whether in the counting-
house or on the football field, for if the League fails, no one team can survive.").
61. See, e.g., San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F.
Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (teams are "all members of a single unit
competing as such with other similar professional leagues"). See also National
Football League v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982) ("[tlhe
NFL owners are joint venturers who produce a product, professional football")
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
62. See, e.g., Myron C. Grauer, The Use and Misuse of the Term "Consumer
Welfare": Once More to the Mat on the Issue of Single Entity Status for Sports
Leagues under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 TuL. L. REV. 71 (1989); Myron
C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983); Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues
Revisited, 64 TUL. L. REV. 117 (1989); Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status
of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60
TUL. L. REv. 562 (1986); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act:
The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intra League Rivalry,
32 UCLA L. REv. 219 (1984); Terrance Ahern, Note, The NFL's Final Victory
Over Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.: Single Entity-Interleague Economic Analysis, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 541 (1978); James L. Brock, Jr., Comment, A Substantive Test
for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications for Professional Sports Leagues, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 999 (1985); see also Donald G. Kempf, Jr., The Misapplication of
Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 625 (1983).
63. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); North
Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); McNeil v. National Football League, 1992-1
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different interests and needs of sports leagues might support argu-
ments for the application of different antitrust standards, the "single
entity" theory should not confer effective antitrust immunity.6 In-
stead, a proper analysis of the significance of these differences
requires consideration of the particular restraints and of their effects
on competition.
Nowhere are these limitations on competition more prevalent than
with respect to agreements between teams and their players. Two
types of restraints have occasioned the greatest amount of litigation-
agreements among teams allocating initial rights to bargain with
players, usually known as "player drafts," and subsequent limitations
on the right of players freely to move from one team to another.
The cases challenging these limitations on player freedom have
generally reached various conclusions. Since these restraints appear
on their face similar to concerted refusals to deal in other commercial
settings, which have often been struck down under the per se ap-
proach,6 on occasion the per se rule has been applied here as well.6
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,841, at 67,978-80 (D. Minn. 1992). See also Chicago
Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667,
672-73 (7th Cir.) (NBA has some attributes of joint venture, and some of single
entity; determination is complicated and fact-laden, and will not be undertaken on
appeal absent significant deliberation; characterization by trial court is entitled to
substantial deference), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1992).
64. As the court recognized in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
990 (1984), accepting this defense would effectively immunize football-and presum-
ably all other professional sports-from almost all antitrust challenges. See also
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1976) (restraints
on competition within market for player services fall within Sherman Act), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). See generally 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW
1478d (1986); Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, Professional Sports and
the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITTIER
L. REv. 217 (1982); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory,
63 TUL. L. REv. 751 (1989); Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues,
Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991); Daniel E. Lazaroff,
Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Questions, 20
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 (1988); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of
Franchise Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 157 (1984).
65. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
See generally 2 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW §§ 10.27-.38 (1980).
Most of the cases challenging these player restraints were decided prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). There, a former member of a purchasing
cooperative challenged its expulsion from the organization. In holding that the rule
of reason was the appropriate standard for evaluating this conduct, the Court
recognized the procompetitive effects of certain cooperative undertakings by com-
petitors. Id. at 295. It concluded that the expulsion would have been unlawful only
if "the cooperative possesses market power or unique access to a business element
necessary for effective competition." Id. at 298.
Northwest Wholesale affords additional support to professional sports teams in
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However, because of the unique needs of professional sports, and
because these agreements normally are not intended to exclude com-
petitors, 67 more frequently it is the rule of reason which has been
held to be the appropriate standard for evaluating them. 68 Finally,
their attempts to rely on the rule of reason for evaluating their cooperative activities.
See, e.g., United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d
1335, 1372 (2d Cir. 1988); Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1357-58 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 667
(7th Cir.) cert. denied, 121 L.Ed. 2d 334 (1992); Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,181, at 64,467-68 (M.D. Fla.
1990); Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. PBA, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 915, 931-32 (E.D. Mo.
1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1991); Martin v. American Kennel Club, Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 997, 1000-01 (N.D. Il. 1988). See also Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's
Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 73 (2d Cir. 1988).
66. See Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,012 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (rule prohibiting member teams from selecting player unless
his college eligibility had expired or until at least five years after he entered college,
was per se illegal group boycott); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp.
1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (rule prohibiting person under age 20 from playing with any
member team in professional hockey league probably per se unlawful group boycott);
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(per se rule appropriate for basketball league's use of player draft, reserve clause
and uniform player contracts), settlement of class action approved, 72 F.R.D. 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro-
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1058, 1062-66 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (applying
per se rule to basketball league's rule prohibiting player from negotiating with NBA
teams until four years after his high school class graduation), injunction reinstated
sub nom. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, J., in
chambers, 1971), noted in Jeffrey Garland, Antitrust Law: Procedural Safeguard
Requirements in Concerted Refusals to Deal: An Application to Professional Sports-
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro-Management, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 1971), 10 SAN DEnEo L.
REV. 413 (1973). See also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541 (7th Cir.
1986) (applying per se rule to agreement to refuse lease arrangements to bidder for
professional basketball franchise).
67. The Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co. explained that per se condemnation is reserved for "joint efforts by
a firm or firms to disadvantage competitors by 'either directly denying or persuading
or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relationships the competitors need in the
competitive struggle."' 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985) (emphasis added). The player
restraints involve potential "concerted refusals to deal" with persons supplying
services to the teams, rather than refusals to deal with competitors.
68. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-82 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (NFL player draft); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618-
20 (8th Cir. 1976) (NFL restrictions on team changes by players), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); McNeil v. National Football League, 1992-1 Trade Cas. CCH
69,841, at 67,992-93 (D. Minn. 1992) (contemplated wage scale for football players).
See also Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 79-82 (N.D. Cal.
1974) ("in this particular field of sports league activities the purposes of the antitrust
laws can be just as well served (if not better served) by the basic antitrust reason-
ableness test as by the absolute per se test sometimes applied by the courts in other
fields"), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
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because less restrictive alternatives to these limitations often exist,
and because, regardless of the defendants' motives, limitations none-
theless have adverse effects on competition, 9 they have frequently
been struck down as unlawful.70
Finally, and perhaps most important, it should be noted that in
the past decade, these restraints have become the subject of collective
bargaining agreements in virtually all professional sports. As a result,
team owners have surrendered at the bargaining table some of the
rights they have won in the courts. 7' On the other hand, because of
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
Perhaps relying on the aphorism that "the best defense is a good offense,"
and responding to the numerous challenges to the NFL's player restraints, the
League initiated an action against the players' association, asserting that the agree-
ment to share information on player compensation with agents for the players
constituted unlawful price fixing. In Five Smiths, Inc. v. National Football League
Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042, 1055 (D. Minn. 1992), the court dismissed the
complaint, finding the conduct lawful under both a per se rule and rule of reason
approach. Under the latter, the court held that the challenged conduct was merely
a step towards equalizing the bargaining ability that players lost because of exclusive
rights assigned to teams through the draft system. Id. The court also concluded that
this type of information exchange was procompetitive by enhancing salary negotia-
tions, since it gave data to the players which the team owners already possessed.
Id.
69. A principal result of both types of restraints is the reduction, or even
the elimination, of the players' options regarding the teams with which they can
bargain, which in turn drives down salaries.
70. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (NFL player draft); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620-
22 (8th Cir. 1976) (NFL restrictions on team changes by players), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 81-83
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (challenging both NFL player draft and restrictions on team
changes by players), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). See also Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957) (claim by football player-coach that teams conspired to
refuse to hire him because he played for rival league stated antitrust cause of action);
Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Minn. 1972) (refusing to
enjoin hockey player from performing contract with team in rival league, since
reserve clause in earlier contract may violate § 1); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503-13 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(although doubt existed whether established hockey league's use of reserve clause
violated § 1, its use clearly justified grant of preliminary injunctive relief, as an
element of § 2 violation). But see McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d
1193, 1197 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[a]ssuming without deciding that reserve systems such
a [sic] those here are subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and could be violative
of it .... "). See generally Note, Antitrust-Restraint of Trade-Group Boycott-
NFL College Draft, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 747 (1977).
71. Thus, although baseball enjoys a complete exemption from the antitrust
laws, collective bargaining has won for baseball players most of the same rights to
become "free agents" and to move from one team to another as those enjoyed by
players in other professional sports.
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the labor exemption, 72 the result of embodying some of these res-
traints in collective bargaining agreements has been to insulate them
from subsequent challenges under the antitrust laws."
72. See generally 9 EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW §§ 72.1-72.8 (1989).
73. One of the more extreme illustrations of the insulation of these disputes
from antitrust challenge because of the labor exemption is Powell v. National
Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991).
The NFL Players Association had agreed to certain limitations on the rights of
players to sign with other teams. After the collective bargaining agreement incor-
porating these restrictions expired, and after attempts to arrive at a new agreement
embodying different restraints failed, the Association brought an action challenging
these limitations under the antitrust laws. Id. at 1295. Dismissing these claims, the
Eighth Circuit held that (1) the labor exemption can be relied upon equally by
employers and employees; (2) the exemption continues to apply to terms contained
in the collective bargaining agreement even after its expiration; and (3) the exemption
still continues after an impasse has led to the breakdown of labor negotiations, as
long as there is a possibility that proceedings might be commenced before the
National Labor Relations Board, or until final resolution (including appeal) of
NLRB proceedings. Id. at 1303-04. Finally, after a majority of NFL players voted
to end collective bargaining, and the NFL Players Association decided to abandon
all collective bargaining rights, the district court held that the labor exemption was
no longer available; the court rejected the defendants' argument that actual decer-
tification by the NLRB was required for loss of the exemption. McNeil v. National
Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1355-57 (D. Minn. 1991).
A subsequent district court rejected Powell's extended continuing application
of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp.
125 (D.D.C. 1991). In Brown, players on the NFL's "developmental squads"
challenged uniform salary provisions in their contracts. Id. at 127. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs were properly a part of the bargaining unit represented
by the NFL Players Association, since they were potential professional football
players. Id. at 129. However, the court held that the better rule was that the
exemption ceased upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement; it further
concluded that, in any event, the exemption should cease when the parties reached
an impasse. Id. at 130-34. See also Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1987) (collective bargaining agreement between basketball league and
players' association acceding to salary limitations and recognizing college draft was
absolute bar to individual player's antitrust claim); McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-1203 (6th Cir. 1979) (terms regarding reserve system-
limiting teams with which professional hockey player may negotiate-were product
of good faith, arm's length bargaining; their incorporation in collective bargaining
agreement conferred immunity under nonstatutory labor exemption); Bridgeman v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 963-67 (D.N.J. 1987) (although
exemption is not lost at moment of expiration of collective bargaining agreement,
it "survives only as long as the employer continues to impose that restriction
unchanged, and reasonably believes that the practice or a close variant of it will be
incorporated in the next collective bargaining agreement"); Zimmerman v. National
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-08 (D.D.C. 1986) (limitation on choices of
professional football player resulting from union-management agreement on "sup-
plemental draft" immunized by nonstatutory exemption). Cf. Reynolds v. National
Football League, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978) (district court's approval of settlement
in class action by football players" providing damages and permitting future disputes
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4. Restrictions on Franchise Locations
In all professional sports, league rules or bylaws typically con-
template the assignment of each team to a location at which it plays
to be resolved through collective bargaining, was not abuse of discretion); National
Hockey League v. National Hockey League Players Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 288 (D.
Minn. 1992) (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over action by league against
players' bargaining representative, seeking declaratory judgment that league's rules
requiring "equalization payments" to player's former team, by team signing free
agent, did not violate antitrust laws). But see Mackey v. National Football League,
543 F.2d 606, 611-16 (8th Cir. 1976) (nonstatutory exemption unavailable when
asserted agreement on player restraints was not "product of bona fide arm's length
bargaining"), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,
782 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1991) (in event of impasse, nonstatutory exemption ends
at expiration of contract; refusing to follow Powell); Kapp v. National Football
League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 83-86 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (exemption inapplicable to restraints
imposed on player prior to effective date of collective bargaining agreement), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
907 (1979); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 881-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (labor exemption did not preclude players' antitrust action chal-
lenging reserve clause, player draft and proposed merger between two basketball
leagues, since these were not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining), approving
settlement in class action, 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 496-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (exemption not available when use
of reserve clause not only preceded formation of player organization, but has
subsequently been resisted by players); Boston Prof. Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348
F. Supp. 261, 265-68 (D. Mass. 1972) (contracts containing reserve clauses, binding
hockey player to one team, not shielded by labor exemption; clauses antedated
collective bargaining negotiations), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d 127 (1st
Cir. 1972). See generally articles cited supra note 58; Phillip J. Closius, Not at the
Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a Maturing Sports Industry,
24 B.C. L. REV. 341 (1983); Addison E. Dewey, Professional Athletes - Affluent
Elitists or Victims of the Reserve System? An Emerging Paradox - Courts Protect
Such Athletes From Antitrust Violations But Collective Bargaining Has Resulted in
Antitrust Immunity for Leagues and Club Owners, 8 Omo N.U. L. REV. 453 (1981);
Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks the
National Football League Players Association, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 135 (1990);
Edward Newman, A Player's View of the NFL Reserve System, 4 ENT. & SPORTS
L.J. 129 (1987); Neil K. Roman, Illegal Procedure: The National Football League
Players Union's Improper Use of Antitrust Litigation for Purposes of Collective
Bargaining, 67 DENv. U. L. REv. 111 (1990); George Stephanopoulos, Plan B's
Inevitable Demise: The Consequence of Powell v. National Football League, 8 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 121 (1991); David S. Underhill, The National Football
League Draft Eligibility Rule, the Labor Exemption, and Antitrust Law: It is Time
to Put Amateurism Back into College Athletics, 3 COOLEY L. REV. 567 (1985);
Richard E. Bartolo, Note, NFL Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack,
1991 DUKE L.J. 503; Bradley R. Cahoon, Comment, Powell v. National Football
League: Modified Impasse Standard Determines Scope of Labor Exemption, 1990
UTAH L. REV. 348 (1990); Scott J. Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Asso-
ciation Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157 (1985); Michael
S. Hobel, Note, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of
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its home games. These rules also provide that a team may not move
its home site without the permission of the other league members or
of the league itself. Some agreement on location is obviously neces-
sary to facilitate scheduling of games, arrangements for broadcasts
and the like. It is further asserted that franchise movement restrictions
are necessary to protect fan interest and loyalty, to insure that no
team is located in a market that is not capable of supporting a
healthy franchise, to insure that the home attendance of other league
members is not eroded by multiple franchises in the same area, and
to protect the interests and investments of local governments in stadia
and other facilities. 74The lawfulness of these restraints was extensively considered in
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League." The NFL had adopted bylaws that required the approval
of three-quarters of the League's owners before any League member
could relocate into the home territory of another League member.
After the team owners voted to refuse permission to one of the
League members that sought to move its franchise, the team brought
an action-joined by the stadium to which the move would have
been made-challenging the legality of these bylaws.7 6 A jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiffs. 7 7
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, the court-although noting that agreements to divide markets
are normally presumed illegal78 -initially concluded -that "the unique
structure of the NFL precludes application of the per se rule ....
Instead, we must examine [the NFL's Rule] to determine whether it
reasonably serves the legitimate collective concerns of the owners or
instead permits them to reap excess profits at the expense of the
consuming public." 7 9 After undertaking this analysis, the court then
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164
(1982); Comment, Nearly a Century in Reserve: Organized Baseball, Collective
Bargaining and the Antitrust Exemption Enter the 80s, 8 PEPP. L. REv. 313 (1981);
Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 874 (1991); Note, 15 NEW ENG. L. REv. 765
(1980).
74. See Football Commissioner Urges Congress to Give Club Owners Limited
Exemption, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 340 (Aug. 19, 1982). See
generally James Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional
Sports, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 42 (1973).
75. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
76. Id. at 1383.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
79. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
726 F.2d at 1392 (citations omitted).
[T]he critical question is whether the jury could have determined that Rule
4.3 reasonably served the NFL's interest in producing and promoting its
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upheld the jury's conclusion that under the circumstances, the NFL
Rule violated the Sherman Act because it caused significant harm to
competition 0 and because its benefits could have been achieved by
less restrictive means.8'
While the status of territorial restraints on sports franchise move-
ments has been the subject of considerable analysis in the legal
literature,8 2 these limitations have not been tested in subsequent
litigation. 83 It seems appropriate, however, that they would continue
to be tested under a rule of reason approach.8 4
product, i.e., competing in the entertainment market, or whether Rule 4.3
harmed competition among the 28 teams to such an extent that any benefits
to the League as a whole were outweighed.
Id. at 1394.
80. The court noted that:
Exclusive territories insulate each team from competition within the NFL
market, in essence allowing them to set monopoly prices to the detriment
of the consuming public. The rule also effectively foreclosed free compe-
tition among stadia such as the Los Angeles Coliseum that wish to secure
NFL tenants.
Id. at 1395.
81. In response to the NFL's argument that Rule 4.3 was reasonable because
it deterred team transfers, the court noted that "no standards or durational limits
are incorporated into the voting requirement to make sure that concern is satisfied.
Nor are factors such as fan loyalty and team rivalries necessarily considered." Id.
at 1396. In addition, the court suggested that "[slome sort of procedural mechanism
to ensure consideration of . . . factors [such as population, economic projections,
facilities, and regional balance] may also be necessary, including an opportunity for
the team proposing the move to present its case." Id. at 1397. For the subsequent
opinion on the appropriate measure of damages, see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 826 (1987).
82. See generally articles cited supra note 62 and 73; Jeffrey Glick, Profes-
sional Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act: When and Where Teams
Should be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55 (1983); John A. Gray,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Control over NFL Franchise Locations: The
Problem of Opportunistic Behavior, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 123 (1987); Lewis S. Kur-
lantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 15 CoNN. L. REV. 183
(1983); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation
Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FoRDHAM L. REV. 157 (1984); John C.
Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition
and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 .DUKE L.J. 1013; Richard Amoroso,
Note, Controlling Professional Sports Team Relocations: The Oakland Raiders'
Antitrust Case and Beyond, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 283 (1986); Charles Gray, Comment,
Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CALiF. L. REV. 1329 (1986); Ronald J.
Shingler, Note, Antitrust Law and the Sports League Relocation Rules, 18 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 35 (1988); Mark A. Wesker, Comment, Franchise Flight and the
Forgotten Fan: An Analysis of the Application of Antitrust Laws to the Relocation
of Professional Football Franchises, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 567 (1986); Daniel S.
York, Note, The Professional Sports Community Act: Congress' Best Response to
Raiders?, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 345 (1987).
83. See National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d
19931
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5. Other Restrictions 5
Professional sports leagues and organizations have also created
and enforced a number of other rules and standards, which ostensibly
are designed to preserve equality of on-field competition, to enhance
fan interest and loyalty, and to maintain the integrity of the sport.
Although these restrictions take a variety of forms, among the more
common variety of restraints are limitations on player eligibility,
standards for membership in organizations, and rules regarding equip-
ment or venue. Many of these restraints have effects not only on
players and team owners, but also on third parties.
562, 567-68 (9th Cir.) (Los Angeles Coliseum did not establish criteria leagues must
employ in evaluating franchisee's requests to move location; rule of reason governs
league rules), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987), noted in, Daniel B. Rubanowitz,
Casenote, Who Said "There's No Place Like Home?": Franchise Relocation in
Professional Sports, 10 LOYOLA ENT. L. J. 163 (1990).
Similar restraints imposed by the National Hockey League on movements on
franchises by its member teams were previously upheld in San Francisco Seals, Ltd.
v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The court found
that the League members were acting together in a common business enterprise, and
that the League rule effected no restraint on competition in the relevant market-
production of professional hockey in the United States and Canada. Curiously, in
Los Angeles Coliseum, the Ninth Circuit noted its disagreement with this decision
but did not overrule it, although it was decided by a trial court in the same circuit.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d
1356, 1390 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).
84. The antitrust implications of a refusal to award a new franchise to an
applicant, as opposed to the refusal to permit an existing franchisee to move its
location, are raised by Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d
772 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra notes 25-30, 53-57 and accompanying text. See also
Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 783 F.2d 1347, 1350
(9th Cir. 1986) (denial of franchise to city with minor league hockey team had no
adverse effect on competition, since competition had not existed prior to refusal to
award franchise); cf. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986)
(refusal of sports arena owner to rent facility to eventually unsuccessful bidder for
professional basketball franchise stated claims for denial of "essential facility" and
group boycott).
85. See generally John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports:
The Antitrust Issues, 18 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 703 (1977); Dana M. Campbell,
Note, Antitrust Analysis in Professional Sports Management Cases: The Public Cries
"Foul!, " 25 Aiuz. L. REv. 995 (1983); A. Randall Farnsworth, Comment, Herschel
Walker v. National Football League: A Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging the
Propriety of the National Football League's Four-or-Five Year Rule Under the
Sherman Act, 9 PEPP. L. REv. 603 (1982); Karen A. Marencik, Note, The National
Football League Eligibility Rule and Antitrust Law: Illegal Procedure, 19 VAL. U.
L. REv. 729 (1985); Christian M. McBurney, Note, The Legality of Sports Leagues'
Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 925 (1985); Robert B. Terry,
Comment, Application of Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports' Eligibility and
Draft Rules, 46 Mo. L. REv. 797 (1981); Comment, Antitrust: Preseason Football
Tickets and Tie-ins: Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.
1974), 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 495.
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Courts have usually treated these restraints similarly to those on
players and on team franchise locations discussed earlier. Because of
a recognition that these restraints are necessary and often benefit
competition, they are not rejected out of hand. Instead, courts have
used a rule of reason approach, weighing the nature and purpose of
the rule, its effect on competitors and on competition, and the
existence of less restrictive alternatives to the approach adopted.16
Restrictions on player eligibility have been the most frequent
source of antitrust challenge. 7 In some cases the courts have had
little difficulty in rejecting the claim; two leading examples were
banning from the sport a basketball player who bet on games
involving the team for which he played,8" and a rule excluding one-
eyed hockey players, which was adopted for safety reasons. 9 Other
rules, such as a requirement that professional golfers demonstrate
certain skill levels as a condition of being allowed to continue to
participate in national tournaments, have been upheld after judicial
scrutiny2. On the other hand, certain other rules-for example, one
barring professional bowlers from taking part in sanctioned tourna-
ments if they participated in tournaments other than at a few
approved locations, thereby excluding other facilities from organized
86. Cf. Cha-Car, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 752 F.2d 609, 613, 615
n.15 (l1th Cir. 1985) (policy of two race tracks assigning limited stall space in
stables at race meets, evaluated under rule of reason; affirming jury's verdict of
reasonableness). But see Blalock v. Ladies Prof. Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (decision by golf association committee, made up of plaintiff's
fellow golfers, to increase penalty for alleged cheating incident from fine and
probation to one-year suspension from play, was group boycott which was unlawful
per se).
87. See generally Mark F. Anderson, Sherman Act and Professional Sports
Associations' Use of Eligibility Rules, 47 NEB. L. REV. 82 (1968); Robert H. Heidt,
"Don't Talk of Fairness": The Chicago School's Approach Toward Disciplining
Professional Athletes, 61 IND. L.J. 53 (1985); David G. Kabbes, Professional Sports'
Eligibility Rules: Too Many Players on the Field, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233.
88. Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) ("rule ... providing for the suspension of those who place wagers on games
in which they are participating seems not only reasonable, but necessary for the
survival of the league."). See also Cokin v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc.,
1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,367 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (expulsion of members for
violation of League rules was not per se unlawful group boycott; reasonableness
inquiry required determination whether adequate procedural safeguards were ac-
corded in disciplinary proceedings); Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306
F. Supp. 1215, 1219-21 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (suspension of bowler for participating in
tournament under assumed name was lawful, absent showing of bad faith by
association).
89. Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
90. Dessen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165, 170-72 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). See also Hatley v. American Quarter Horse
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 651-54 (5th Cir. 1977) (per se rule inapplicable to rules adopted
by horse registration association, limiting registration rights to certain horses; under
particular facts, refusal to register plaintiff's horse was reasonable).
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bowling91-have been found unduly restrictive of competition without
producing countervailing benefits, and therefore have been struck
down as unreasonable. 92
The legality of membership rules for the actual participants, or
minimum standards for continued inclusion by entrepreneurs in an
organization sponsoring or regulating a particular sport, also will
turn on the purpose of the restrictions and their effect on competition.
At one end of the spectrum, standards that do not exclude persons
or groups on invidious grounds and that are then implemented fairly
will normally withstand antitrust challenge. 9 At the other extreme,
membership rules serving no substantial legitimate objective of the
sport in question, while producing adverse competitive effects, will
be struck down. A leading example of such an exclusionary rule was
the NFL bylaw that prohibited any franchisee owner from also having
an interest in a competing sports team.94
91. Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356
F.2d 371, 375-77 (9th Cir. 1966).
92. See Medlin v. Professional Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n, 1992-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,787 (D. Colo. 1991) (rule prohibiting cowboys from participating in
professional rodeo association's sanctioned championship finals if they competed in
non-sanctioned rodeos enjoined as anticompetitive horizontal conspiracy); see also
Bowman v. National Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Minn. 1975)
(enjoining policy of football league preventing its member clubs from hiring indi-
viduals who had previously played for teams in defunct rival league); cf. National
Wrestling Alliance v. Myers, 325 F.2d 768, 775 (8th Cir. 1963) (monopolization
claim asserted against organization of wrestling promoters might state Sherman § 2
claim; verdict for plaintiff reversed for lack of evidence).
93. See Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454-56 (2d Cir.)
(suspension of boxing promoter from organization, resulting in his inability to
continue promoting title fights, was subject to rule of reason analysis, and on facts
was not unlawful group boycott), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States
Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 787-90 (7th Cir. 1981)
(harness racing association's prohibition on its members participating in races at
non-association-member tracks tested by rule of reason; per se rule inappropriate
for self-regulatory groups involved in organized sports); Martin v. American Kennel
Club, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 997, 1004-05 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (professional dog handler's
suspension, for using abusive language at dog show, had no adverse impact on
competition and was valid under rule of reason); Cooney v. American Horse Shows
Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (association's rule holding trainers
responsible for presence of drugs in horses and permitting their suspension for
violation of rule was tested under rule of reason); Levin v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (league members' vote refusing to
allow sale of member club to plaintiffs had no anticompetitive effect and was not
unreasonable, regardless of members' motivation). See also United States v. United
States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,761 (S.D. Ohio 1960) (harness
racing association's regulations merely standardized rules of sport and promoted
competition).
94. North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249,
1260-61 (2d Cir.) (rule banning concurrent ownership by NFL team members of
franchise in professional soccer league unreasonable; rule bars entry by most likely
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Limitations on equipment or venue receive similar analysis. Since
some standardization of equipment is frequently necessary to assure
equality and fairness among on-field competitors, these restrictions
will usually be upheld;95 similarly, reasonable agreement on venue
will also be found lawful.9 However, limitations may be struck down
if they are judged more restrictive than necessary to promote legiti-
mate sporting goals, or if they appear principally designed to injure
competitors of the members of the sports organization. 97
II. AMATEUR SPORTS98
Non-professional sports-principally those involving intercolle-
giate athletics and the Olympics and related events-are nonetheless
group of entrants into competing sports organization), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074
(1982). See also Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265
(N.D. Ga. 1973). See generally Allan Ashman, Antitrust Law ... Cross-Ownership
Ban, 68 A.B.A. J. 852 (1982); Drew D. Krause, Comment, The National Football
League's Ban on Corporate Ownership: Violating Antitrust to Preserve Traditional
Ownership-Implications Arising From William H. Sullivan's Antitrust Suit, 2 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 175 (1992); David S. Moynihan, Applying "Rule of Reason"
Analysis Under the Sherman Act to Private Bans on Cross-Ownership, 15 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 697 (1980).
95. See, e.g., M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973,
980 (1st Cir. 1984) (rule adopted by several auto race tracks which limited drivers
to a single manufacturer's tire for entire season was tested by rule of reason because
it was "promulgated in a sports self-regulation context"; rule was not unlawful
since it was adopted for reasonable purposes unrelated to intent to exclude com-
petitors); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp.
1103, 1116-17 (D. Neb.) (rule prohibiting double-strung tennis rackets evaluated
under rule of reason rather than per se rule; rule lawful because it was intended to
further legitimate goals of preserving integrity of game), aff'd per curiam, 665 F.2d
222 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. PBA, Inc., 746 F. Supp.
915, 932-33 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (bowlers' association's enforcement of rules, requiring
prior approval of balls and limiting balls bearing commercial logos, was neither
group boycott of ball manufacturer, nor price fixing respecting commercials for
televised tournaments), aff'd, 935 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1991); STP Corp. v. United
States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146, 171 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (change in specifi-
cations of turbine engines used in race cars was reasonably designed to enhance
competition).
96. See Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 821-22 (9th
Cir.) (agreement between two horse-racing track operators, sharing a single facility,
as to allocation of dates in racing season, was not per se unlawful territorial division
or temporal allocation agreement), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982).
97. See M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 560 F. Supp. 591,
602-04 (D. Mass. 1983) (rule adopted by auto race tracks, in conjunction with tire
manufacturer, prohibiting use of more than one brand of tire within specified price
range at tracks, unduly limited competition from other tire manufacturers and was
unreasonable per se), rev'd, 733 F.2d 973 (1st Cir. 1984).
98. See generally Steven H. Burkow & Fred L. Slaughter, Should Amateur
Athletes Resist the Draft?, 7 BLACK L.J. 314 (1981); Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark
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still "big business," involving expenditures and revenues running to
the billions of dollars. Although the teams and their participants are
not necessarily actuated by profit motives, their activities can have
important effects in a variety of markets, in which the promotion or
preservation of competition is a significant concern. Therefore, these
activities may raise antitrust issues, and the question of potential
antitrust immunity will surface.
A. Intercollegiate Athletics"
Virtually all major institutions which participate in intercollegiate
athletics are members of or affiliated with the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA). I°° Although both independent acts of
individual colleges, and independent agreements between schools or
athletic conferences, might raise antitrust concerns, the majority of
antitrust disputes are the result of adherence to NCAA rules, which
may impact adversely on competition.
The most significant antitrust challenges to collegiate sports ac-
tivities have arisen in two broad arenas: off-the-field activities, par-
ticularly involving broadcasting rights; and game-related rulemaking,
Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports: The Role of Noneconomic Values, 61
IND. L.J. 31 (1985); James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports
Organizations, 61 IND. L.J. 9 (1985); Donald L. Shuk, Jr., Note, Administration
of Amateur Athletics: The Time for an Amateur Athlete's Bill of Rights has Arrived,
48 FoiRDHAm L. REv. 53 (1979).
99. See generally Arthur D. Austin, The Legality of Ticket Tie-Ins in Inter-
collegiate Athletics, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (1980); Lee Goldman, Sports and
Antitrust: Should College Students be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206
(1990) [hereinafter Goldman]; Deborah E. Klein and William B. Briggs, Proposition
48 and the Business of Intercollegiate Athletics: Potential Antitrust Ramifications
under the Sherman Act, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 301 (1990); Richard B. McKenzie &
E. Thomas Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes? An Economic and
Legal Reinterpretation, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 373 (1987); Sharon E. Rush, Touch-
downs, Toddlers, and Taboos: On Paying College Athletes and Surrogate Contract
Mothers, 31 Az. L. REV. 549 (1989); John C. Weistart, Antitrust Issues in the
Regulation of College Sports, 5 J.C. & U.L. 77 (1978); Kelly W. Bhirdo, Linda A.
Haviland & Thomas J. Warth, Comment, McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association: College Athletics Sanctions from an Antitrust and Civil Rights Per-
spective, 15 J.C. & U.L. 459 (1989); Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association's
Certification Requirement: A Section 1 Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9
VAL. U. L. REV. 193 (1974); Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust
Analysis, 87 YAL L.J. 655 (1978).
100. See generally Goldman, supra note 99, at 209-12; Terrill L. Johnson,
The Antitrust Implications of the Divisional Structure of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 8 U. MImA.M ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 97 (1991) (questioning
under the antitrust laws the structuring of the NCAA's giving Division I teams
significant economic advantage); James C. Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (1973) (examining the problems of the NCAA as
a business cartel and advocating the need for restructuring).
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particularly focusing on player eligibility standards. 10 While most
courts have not accorded a general immunity to the NCAA or its
members regarding these activities, the decisions also recognize that
somewhat different standards may be appropriate for evaluating their
legality.The leading case in the area of intercollegiate athletics, arising
from a dispute involving broadcasting rights, is National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of University of Okla-
homa. 0 2 For several decades, the NCAA had implemented various
plans for the sale of rights for the television broadcasting of live
college football games. These plans placed limits both on the total
number of televised games and on the number of games that any
one college could televise. NCAA members were prohibited from
selling television rights other than in accordance with the plans.
Several universities brought suit challenging these NCAA restrictions,
asserting that they resulted in price fixing and group boycotts in
violation of the Sherman Act.
The NCAA offered two justifications for its television policies:
they protected against the loss of live attendance at games, which
might otherwise occur if there were unlimited televised games, and
they tended to preserve competitive balance among the football
programs of the NCAA member schools. 03 Although the United
States Supreme Court declined to apply a per se rule to these policies,
the Court ultimately rejected these proffered defenses and concluded
that the NCAA regulations violated the antitrust laws.
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court recognized that different
standards-involving Rule of Reason analysis rather than per se
treatment-were appropriate for evaluating these activities. As the
Court went to pains to assert, the reason for this different treatment
was neither the uniqueness of this conduct nor the special qualities
of the defendants. Rather, the particular nature of the "industry"-
intercollegiate sports-required recognition that some restraints of
trade were necessary for effective competition to prevail. °4 However,
here the restraints imposed on the NCAA member institutions were
101. "[I]t is clear that the NCAA is now engaged in two distinct kinds of
rulemaking activity. One type ... is rooted in the NCAA's concern for the protection
of amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a discernible economic
purpose." Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983).
102. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
103. Id. at 96.
104. [W]e have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se
rule to this case. This decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience
with this type of arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA is organized as
a nonprofit entity, or on our respect for the NCAA's historic role in the
preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics. Rather,
what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal
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unreasonable; the restraints injured consumers by limiting output,
reduced competition far more than necessary, and were inappropriate
(and in part also unsuccessful) for achieving their asserted benefits. 05
The other frequent subject of antitrust litigation-player eligibility
or other similar rules-falls into two general categories: rules designed
to preserve some measure of equality among collegiate athletic pro-
grams, and rules intended to preserve ideals of amateurism. Examples
of the former are rules limiting the number of assistant coaches that
may be employed by a member institution in a particular sport."
°6
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all.
Id. at 100-01 (footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 101. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d 511,
516-19 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusal by two universities, which had entered into exclusive
contract with one television network, to allow broadcasting by another network, of
their football games against schools not a party to that contract, was unlawful
concerted refusal to deal); Association of Indep. Television Stations, Inc. v. College
Football Ass'n, 637 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (legality of agreements between
certain football conferences and teams, and certain broadcasters, tested under rule
of reason'; summary judgment inappropriate).
See generally David Greenspan, College Football's Biggest Fumble: The Eco-
nomic Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in NCAA, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 1
(1987); Bryon L. Gregory & J. Craig Busey, Alternative Broadcasting Arrangements
After NCAA, 61 IND. L.J. 65 (1985); Eugene D. Gulland, J. Peter Byrne & Sheldon
E. Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Economic
Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 717 (1984); James F. Ponsoldt, The Unreasonableness of Coerced Cooperation:
A Comment Upon the NCAA Decision's Rejection of the Chicago School, 31
ANTrrRUST BULL. 1003 (1986); Peter W. Bellas, Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents:
Supreme Court Intercepts Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason, 39 U. MLIn L. REV.
529 (1985); Robert L. Jackstadt, Note, Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: Antitrust Violations in College
Football, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 207 (1984); Robert J. Kirby, Note, Antitrust Law-
NCAA Thrown for a Loss by Courts' Traditional Antitrust Blitz-NCAA v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), 18 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 917 (1985); Christine O'Connor, Note, Final Score: Board of Regents 3,
NCAA O-Supreme Court Affirms Tenth Circuit's Finding that NCAA Television
Plan Constituted Restraint of Trade, 62 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (1985); Robert M.
Pfeifer, Comment, Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, Application of the Per-Se Rule to Price-Fixing
Arrangements, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 185 (1983); Suzanne E. Rand, Note, The
Commercialization of College Football: The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia
Learn an Antitrust Lesson in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 12 PEPP. L. REv. 515
(1985); Johnathan F. Seib, Note, Antitrust and Nonmarket Goods: The Supreme
Court Fumbles Again- National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Re-
gents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), 60 WASH. L. REv. 721 (1985); William J. Sims, Note,
NCAA v. Board of Regents, A Truncated Rule of Reason: Retaining Flexibility
Without Sacrificing Efficiency, 27 AIZ. L. REV. 193 (1985); Major Bashinsky,
Recent Decision, Hennessey & Hodson v. NCAA, No. 76-P-0799-W (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 27, 1976), 7 Cumi. L. REV. 505 (1977); Eric D. Daniels, Casenote, Did the
Supreme Court Fumble? The Supreme Court's Failure to Endorse a Market Power
Threshold to the Application of the Rule of Reason for Cases Under Section I of
the Sherman Act in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 27 B.C. L. REV. 579 (1986).
106. See, e.g., Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136,
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Examples of the latter are limitations on the financial benefits that
may be given to student-athletes,' 7 prohibitions on continuing to
play college-level football after a player submits his name for the
professional draft, 08 or a ban on playing college hockey if the player
received compensation for playing the sport prior to enrollment in
college. 109
Since the adoption of these kinds of limitations does not reflect
the same economic motivation as those directed to broadcasting
rights, and thus is less likely to diminish competition, some courts
have held eligibility rules to be beyond the ambit of the antitrust
laws." 0 The majority of decisions, however, have held that these
restrictions are also subject to antitrust scrutiny, although usually
with a greater receptivity to the defendants' arguments of justification
or absence of actual injury to competition."'
1147-54 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Weiss v. Eastern College Athletic Conference, 563
F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (athlete not entitled to preliminary injunction against
rule denying eligibility for period of one year to student who transfers from one
school to another; no showing of antitrust violation); Kupec v. Atlantic Coast
Conference, 399 F. Supp. 1377 (M.D. N.C. 1975) (player not entitled to preliminary
injunction; unlikely that rule, denying further eligibility to person participating in
football during four different seasons, violated antitrust laws).
107. See, e.g., McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1441-42 (N.D.
I11. 1989); Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz.
1983). See also College Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,117 (D.N.J.) (Sherman Act does not affect
NCAA rule denying eligibility to students paying fees to agency for assistance in
obtaining athletic scholarships), aff'd without opinion, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
See generally Leonard M. Shulman, Note, Compensation for Collegiate Athletes: A
Run for More Than the Roses, 22 SAN DrEo L. REV. 701 (1985).
108. Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990); Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D.
Ind. 1990), aff'd, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). Cf. Shelton v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976) (NCAA rule, rendering basketball
player who signed professional contract ineligible for continued participation in
intercollegiate athletics, survives equal protections clause challenge). See generally
Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARv. L.
REv. 1299 (1992).
109. Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1975).
110. Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 742-45
(M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295,
303-04 (D. Mass. 1975).
111. Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 856-57
(N.D. Ind. 1990) (restraints lawful under Rule of Reason), aff'd, 977 F.2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1992); Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356,
375-83 (D. Ariz. 1983) (restraints were reasonable); Hennessey v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); College Athletic
Placement Serv., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,117 (D.N.J.) (same), aff'd without opinion, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir.
1974). See also McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338,
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B. Non-Scholastic Amateur Sports 12
The most important amateur sporting events, outside of the
setting of college or high school sports, are the quadrennial Olympic
Games, the Pan-American games, and various qualifying events
leading up to these events." 3 A few other sports-of which golf,"14
tennis"' and hockey" 6 are the most prominent examples' 7-also have
some significant level of involvement by non-professionals. However,
it is in the setting of Olympic-type sports that antitrust disputes have
most frequently arisen.
The bodies which are responsible for supervising and controlling
amateur sports share many of the same concerns as the organizations
that regulate professional sports. The subjects of regulation include
eligibility for participation, uniformity of rules and equipment, and
1343-45 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[assuming, without deciding, that the antitrust laws apply
to the eligibility rules"; restraints were reasonable). Cf. Association for Intercollegiate
Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (NCAA decision to expand activities and regulations to include women's
sports, which drove women's intercollegiate sports organization out of business, not
entitled to antitrust immunity; however, lawful under reasonableness analysis);
Samara v. NCAA, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,536 (E.D. Va. 1973) (mere threat
of denial of eligibility to athletes contemplating participation in uncertified track
meet not actionable; economic injury was merely speculative).
112. See generally Allan C. Bradshaw, Antitrust Policy and Olympic Athletes:
The United States Ski Team Goes for the Gold, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 831.
113. In fact, professional athletes are now permitted to participate in some
Olympic events. For example, in 1992, professional basketball players comprised
virtually the entire American team.
114. See Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United States Golf Ass'n, 766 F. Supp.
1104 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (determination by organization that shoes failed to comply
with Rules of Golf was justified by objective of insuring "that a player's score is
the product of his skill, rather than his equipment"), aff'd, 953 F.2d 651 (1 1th Cir.
1992).
115. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp.
1103 (D. Neb.) (rule prohibiting double-strung tennis rackets evaluated under rule
of reason rather than per se rule; rule lawful, because it was intended to further
legitimate goals of preserving integrity of game), aff'd per curiam, 665 F.2d 222
(8th Cir. 1981).
116. See Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n of U.S., 438 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.
N.Y. 1977) (amateur hockey association's refusal to allow hockey team to compete
in particular league or to play games in certain location may have been motivated
by financial considerations; legality tested by rule of reason).
117. See also Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract Bridge League, 428
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970) (refusal of bridge organization to sanction tournament if
plaintiff's portable computer system was used for scoring was neither per se unlawful
group boycott, nor was it unreasonable because of anticompetitive motive to
eliminate or damage plaintiff), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971). Cf. Amateur
Softball Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 467 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972) (absolute
exemption for professional baseball does not extend to amateur baseball).
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location of events. 8 Because of the perceived need for self-regulation
and cooperation, as well as the diminished likelihood of a significant
adverse effect on competition from restraints involving amateur sports,
here too, courts have used the rule of reason as the appropriate
standard for evaluating the legality of these restraints." 9
Control and supervision of the Olympic Games has been vested
initially in the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Each nation
must be represented by a national Olympic committee that is rec-
ognized by the IOC, and the national committees in turn recognize
a national governing body (NGB) for each Olympic sport. 20 In this
country, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC)-which is a
private corporation established pursuant to federal statute 12'-has
been recognized by the IOC as the American national Olympic
committee. In 1978, because of a substantial level of disorganization
and in-fighting, Congress passed the Amateur Sports Act' 2 2 to regu-
larize this structure. The system created by this statute presumes that
there will be monolithic control by a recognized NGB for each
amateur sport, and the statute delegates substantial regulatory au-
thority to the USOC and to each NGB.
The antitrust status of this system was examined by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Behagen v. Amateur
Basketball Association of the United States.123 Pursuant to the rules
of the Federation Internationale de Basketball Amateur (FIBA)-the
international organization that governs amateur basketball-a player
seeking to play in a foreign country is required to obtain a travel
permit from his home country's NGB and a FIBA license. In Be-
hagen, the plaintiff, an American, had entered into a contract to
play in an "amateur" basketball league in Italy. Because the plaintiff
had previously played professional basketball, the American NGB
informed FIBA that he was ineligible to play amateur sports; FIBA
in turn notified the Italian team of this fact, which then refused to
honor its contract with the plaintiff. In an action against FIBA and
118. See supra notes 85-97.
119. See, e.g., Brant v. United States Polo Ass'n, 631 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (polo player's suspension, resulting in his inability to compete in future
sanctioned match, because of verbal abuse and physical threats to umpire, was
reasonable). See also Ashley Meadows Farm, Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n,
617 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (equestrian federation's rule, limiting time
and place of holding various categories of recognized horse shows, evaluated under
rule of reason; in absence of injury, owner-operator of unapproved horse shows
lacked standing to challenge rule).
120. Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 884 F.2d 524, 527 (10th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
121. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-384 (1982).
122. Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396
(1982)).
123. 884 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
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the American NGB, asserting that the defendants' conduct constituted
an illegal group boycott, the Tenth Circuit held that this conduct
was impliedly immunized from antitrust scrutiny by the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978.124
The statute's express provision for a single NGB in each sport
resulted in extending a high degree of control over that sport to the
NGB. Since that degree of control over amateur basketball resulted
in precisely the kind of antitrust violation of which the plaintiff
complained, and since the defendants' actions here were "necessary
to implement the clear intent of Congress," the Tenth Circuit found
an implied exemption from the antitrust laws for this conduct.1 21
CONCLUSION
Sports-be they professional or amateur-involve competition
both on and off the field. While regulation and agreement with
respect to the on-field competition are both necessary and inevitable,
the appropriate scope of limitations on the off-field aspects of sports
is less obvious. Attempts to constrain this latter form of competition
will frequently raise issues under the antitrust laws. The accommo-
dation of these interests requires sensitivity to the goals and values
implicit in both of these important areas.
124. 884 F.2d at 527-30.
125. Id.
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